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Abstract
In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality
of goods is a seller’s private information. We show that in equilibrium all goods can be traded if a simple
piece of information is made publicly available: the size of the informed side of the market. Moreover,
we show that if exchanges can take place frequently enough, then agents roughly enjoy the entire potential
surplus from exchanges. We illustrate these ﬁndings with a dynamic model of trade where buyers and sellers
repeatedly interact over time. More precisely we prove that, if the size of the informed side of the market
is a public information at each trading stage, then there exists a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium where
all goods are sold in ﬁnite time and where the price and quality of traded goods are increasing over time.
Moreover, we show that as the time between exchanges becomes arbitrarily small, full trade still obtains in
ﬁnite time – i.e., all goods are actually traded in equilibrium – while total surplus from exchanges converges
to the entire potential. These results suggest two policy interventions in markets suﬀering from dynamic
adverse selection: ﬁrst, the public disclosure of the size of the informed side of the market in each trading
stage and, second, the increase of the frequency of trading stages.




Since the publication of the seminal work by Akerlof (1970), the problem of adverse selection has been
widely investigated by economic theorists. One quite recent development in this regard is the exploration of
the dynamics of exchanges under asymmetric information, and in particular of the phenomenon of dynamic
adverse selection (see e.g., Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999; Janssen and Roy, 2002; Hendel et al., 2005; Moreno
and Wooders, 2010).1 Although several important aspects of dynamic adverse selection have been inves-
tigated, so far no attention has been given to the consequences of the public access to information about
the size of the informed side of the market, e.g., the number of goods or services on the market when their
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1A clear and formal account of dynamic adverse selection can be found in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Ch.9) where the
consequences of multi-stage contracting are analyzed.
1qualities are private information. The present paper explores this issue, identifying the potential beneﬁts
accruing from the public availability of such a piece of information.
In a market where trade can take place sequentially, the public access to information on the size of the
informed side of the market can solve dynamic adverse selection problems. The mechanism behind this
result is actually very simple and can be explained with a short example. Suppose that the informed side is
constituted by two sellers, one who wants to sell one unit of a high quality good and the other who wants
to sell one unit of a low quality good. Qualities are private information of the sellers. What does it mean
to know the size of the informed side? Intuitively, this information tells agents how many goods – but not
which qualities – are still circulating in the market. Upon arrival at the market, buyers are told that two
goods are being supplied: one of high quality and the other of low quality. On the ﬁrst day of the market,
some buyers start oﬀering a low price, certain that for a low price they can only buy the low quality good.
This choice is reasonable since oﬀering a high price would lead to expected losses because of information
asymmetries. Given the low price, the seller of the high quality good will not accept as for her accepting
would mean a certain loss. What about the seller of the low quality good? She could opt to wait in the hope
of higher prices in the following days. However, if she also rejects the oﬀer, then the size of the informed
side does not change – two goods still circulate – and, hence, the following days buyers would face the same
situation so that they would have no reasons to change their oﬀer. Therefore, the seller of the low quality
good ﬁnds it convenient to accept the low price oﬀer, as the alternative would be indeﬁnite waiting. As a
result, the low quality good is sold and the size of the informed side shrinks by one unit. The second day of
the market, upon disclosure of the fact that the size of the informed side has diminished by one unit, buyers
still on the market ﬁnd it reasonable to oﬀer a high price as they know that the day before there were one
high quality good and one low quality good, and that the previous low price oﬀer could only be reasonably
accepted by the low quality seller. Finally, since there is no good reason to expect a higher oﬀer in the
future, the high quality seller accepts the high price oﬀer and the market clears.
The fact that the public knowledge of the size of the informed side of the market is a potential solution
to dynamic adverse selection problems is an interesting ﬁnding from a theoretical perspective, but it might
be of little relevance in practice if the size of the informed size can never be observed. Therefore, a natural
question to ask is how likely it is that market participants have access to such information. At least in some
circumstances, the size of the informed side can be quite a small piece of information to retrieve, e.g., when
the market is small and all participants can directly observe goods. In the light of our analysis, in such
circumstances we may expect that market forces lead to full trade, i.e., to the exchange of all goods brought
to the market. However, not many real markets match this case, not even roughly. Large markets are costly
to monitor. Moreover, the anonymity of market participants makes it hard to keep track of the number of
goods circulating at any given time. In fact, the size of the informed side of the market is not an individual
information, but an intrinsically global one. This last consideration suggests an interesting possibility. Even
if the size of the informed side is not naturally available to market participants, it can be available to market
authoritiesorexternalobservers. Hence, suchkindofinformationisanaturalcandidateforpublicdisclosure
by a dedicated authority, suggesting that our ﬁndings have an important normative insight. Indeed, in
economic situations where adverse selection arises, a benevolent authority could induce additional desirable
exchanges by providing a multi-stage environment for trade where at each stage information about the size
of the informed side of the market is publicly disclosed.
Another important issue is whether the public knowledge of the number of goods circulating in the
market is suﬃcient to let agents enjoy the whole potential surplus from exchanges, as would happen in
the absence of asymmetric information on the quality of goods. Unfortunately, this desirable outcome
in general is not guaranteed because sequential trade may take a substantial amount of time and, hence,
2agents might be forced to wait long periods before enjoying their payoﬀ which, reasonably, would be
discounted accordingly. However, since the amount of time waited before exchanges take place has no
special role in ensuring full trade, there is one straightforward way to increase total surplus: shortening
the time between exchange opportunities. This implies that, if exchange opportunities are frequent enough,
then agents roughly enjoy the whole potential surplus from exchanges.
Although these points are all conceptually simple, to prove them in a suﬃciently general setup turns out
to be quite a complicated task. In order to give readers the possibility to get the substance of our ﬁndings
without forcing them to go through all technicalities and proofs, we begin the analysis (in section 4) by
studying a simpliﬁed version of the model (whose general version is described in section 3). To keep things
as simple as possible, we consider only two qualities (high and low) and assume that agents do not discount
future payoﬀs. The structure of the game is as follows. The market exists for an inﬁnite number of trading
stages or until all goods are sold. Before the market begins the distribution of qualities brought to the market
is announced. In each stage, ﬁrstly the number of goods still unsold is observed and, secondly, buyers make
price oﬀers at which they are willing to buy one good randomly chosen from any seller willing to sell;
thirdly, sellers consider the list of price oﬀers and decide whether to sell or not. We demonstrate that, in this
setup, there exists a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium leading to full trade in ﬁnite time.
The simpliﬁed model of section 4 shows with suﬃcient clarity why adverse selection can be solved
by the possibility to make price oﬀers conditional on the number of goods still on the market. However,
the simple model is not rich enough to tackle other issues of interest which can arise when the number
of qualities brought to the market is greater than two and future payoﬀs are discounted. In section 5 we
study the general model presented in section 3 which can accommodate any number of qualities and the
discounting of future payoﬀs. We show that also in this more general setup there exists a weak perfect
Bayesian equilibrium leading to full trade. The proof of this result turns out to be substantially more
complicated because, depending on qualities and discount factor, it can happen that goods of diﬀerent
qualities must be sold in equilibrium at the same price and in the same trading stage. Applying the model
studied in section 5 we are also able (in section 6) to discuss issues related to welfare and, more speciﬁcally,
to the losses due to the length of trading stages. In this regard we show that as the spell between exchanges
tends to zero – or, equivalently, the discount factor tends to unity – full trade can still be obtained in ﬁnite
time while total surplus tends to the entire potential surplus gainable from exchanges.
In section 7 we discuss a variety of issues related to the nature and robustness of our results. We
begin by assessing some important features of full trade equilibria. Then, we indicate a few reasonable
generalizations of the model which would not substantially modify our results. Moreover, we identify which
assumptions – and, therefore, what market characteristics – are crucial for the emergence of full trade and
the realization of the entire potential surplus from trade. Lastly, we discuss the role played by the possibility
to condition current price oﬀers to past price oﬀers. We argue that this possibility brings in intertemporal
competition among buyers as well as intertemporal competition between one buyer and herself in the past,
potentially preventing full trade for reasons other than information asymmetries. We discuss in detail which
are the cases where the diﬀerent kinds of intertemporal competition lead to the existence of equilibria where
not all goods are sold. We also argue that such equilibria are not intuitively very robust.
Finally, we refer the reader to the next section for a detailed discussion of the relation between the
present paper and the existing literature on adverse selection, with special attention to dynamic and infor-
mational aspects.
32. Related literature
Dynamic adverse selection has recently been considered with an emphasis on the eﬃciency-enhancing
role of multiple-stage contracting. In particular, it has been shown that if traders discount future payoﬀs then
the delay of exchanges can fruitfully work as a screening device, potentially allowing market transactions
that would never be made in the traditional static framework of Akerlof (1970). In this regard, an important
contributionisprovidedbyJanssenandRoy(2002)whoshowthatdelayingexchangesofhighqualitygoods
can eﬀectively screen qualities and lead to full trade in a Walrasian dynamic setup (see also Janssen and
Karamychev, 2002; Janssen and Roy, 2004, for an analysis of exchange cycles). More precisely, Janssen
and Roy show that, under reasonable restrictions on agents’ expectations about the minimum quality still on
the market, every competitive equilibrium leads to full trade in ﬁnite time, with lower qualities being sold
sooner and exchange prices increasing over time. The screening mechanism is based on the fact that sellers
with higher-quality goods have greater incentive to wait for higher prices.
Our model and the one studied by Janssen and Roy (2002) are similar under many respects: there is
a ﬁxed set of potential sellers (each endowed with a unit of the good), the quality of goods varies across
sellers, all buyers have the same valuations of goods, and trade always generate surplus. One diﬀerence is
that Janssen and Roy (2002) focus mainly on the Walrasian approach, while we allow for strategic price
setting.2 The fundamental diﬀerence however lies in the mechanism which makes full trade possible: in our
model the discounting of future payoﬀs is not crucial as the sorting of qualities over time is attained thanks
to the possibility of conditioning price oﬀers on the size of the informed side of the market.3 The relevance
of such a diﬀerence can be appreciated by considering the welfare loss due to the delay of exchanges as the
discounting becomes arbitrarily small. In Janssen and Roy (2002) the welfare loss does not vanish since,
as the discounting diminishes, the delay required for eﬃcient sorting becomes consequently larger. Instead,
as we show in section 6, in our model the welfare loss tends to disappear when the discount factor tends to
unity.
A related body of literature has focused on the role of contract types (e.g., leasing rather than selling)
and the interaction between new and used good markets. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) investigate both the
role and the existence of markets for used durables under dynamic adverse selection. They ﬁnd that the used
goods market never shuts down and, more importantly, that distortions due to information asymmetries are
smaller than when re-sale is not allowed. Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) study the role of leasing contracts in
durable goods markets. They show that, under dynamic adverse selection, leasing contracts for durables
can improve welfare, although they remain imperfect tools. Johnson and Waldman (2003) ﬁnd similar
results, also showing that buybacks can further reduce ineﬃciencies due to asymmetric information.4 Of
particular interest here is the contribution by Hendel et al. (2005) who show that, if consumers observe the
number of times a durable good has changed hand, then the combination of multiple secondary markets and
endogenous assignment of new goods can completely eliminate the ineﬃciencies caused by asymmetric
information. More precisely, they show that there exists a competitive equilibrium in which a menu of
rental contracts induces precisely the same allocation that would prevail if quality were observable. Thus,
2In the last part of the paper Janssen and Roy (2002) provide a game theoretical foundation of competitive equilibria by showing
that the outcome of any such equilibrium can be sustained as weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a game where sellers make
take-or-leave-it oﬀers as well as of a game where buyers compete for the seller’s good as in an auction.
3The fact that the costs of delay due to the discounting of future payoﬀ are not responsible for the sorting of qualities over time
can be neatly recognized by looking at the model presented in section 4, where there is no discounting of future payoﬀs.
4See also Johnson and Waldman (2010) for an extension of the model including moral hazard problems concerning the mainte-
nance choices of owners of non-used goods.
4if consumers can observe the times a good has been rented in the past, then asymmetric information can be
fully overcome.
An important common element between our paper and Hendel et al. (2005) is that both provide a
solution to dynamic adverse selection problems that does not exploit the delay in exchanges as a screening
device (as, e.g., in Janssen and Roy, 2002). This is a relevant point because, as mentioned above, it aﬀects
welfare through the timing of exchanges. One diﬀerence with our approach is that Hendel et al. (2005) focus
on competitive equilibria, disregarding strategic price setting (as done in Janssen and Roy, 2002). The most
important diﬀerence, however, is that the mechanism underlying the provided solutions to dynamic adverse
selection is based on diﬀerent institutional and informational speciﬁcations. In Hendel et al. (2005) full
trade arises only if consumers can publicly observe the vintage of used goods – i.e., the number of times
the good has been rented in the past – that in equilibrium is correctly interpreted as a signal of goods’
deterioration, which in turn allows the eﬃcient sorting of consumers and used goods in secondary markets.
In particular, the use of rental contracts in place of re-sale contracts is crucial because with rental contracts
there is no incentive to keep used goods when they become of a lesser quality, so that vintages become
an eﬀective signal of current quality. In contrast, in our setup goods can change hand just once and only
by standard sale contracts. Moreover, public information is not about vintages but about the number of
goods still on the market, with straightforward consequences on incentives. In particular, the possibility to
condition price oﬀers on the number of goods still on the market gives to buyers an instrument to wipe out
the beneﬁts that a seller may expect to gain by refusing to sell at current prices in the hope of selling in the
future at a higher price.
In recent years there has been an upsurge of interest in the relation between the overall informational
structure and the likelihood of market failures due to adverse selection. Indeed, there are various aspects of
the informational structure that can turn out to be relevant – e.g., the number and the quality of information,
the distribution of information among agents – and it is not always straightforward to understand whether
they mitigate or exacerbate adverse selection problems. Some basic facts, however, are now established.
Kessler (2001) considers a lemons market where the seller can be uninformed with some probability and
shows that welfare is non-monotonic in the amount of information on qualities. Levin (2001) shows that
greater information asymmetries can reduce the gains from trade, although better information on the unin-
formed side unambiguously improves trade when demand is downward sloping. Creane (2008) proves that,
in a pooling equilibrium where a monopolist sells a product of unknown quality to a group of consumers,
welfare can be locally decreasing in the fraction of informed consumers. Sarath (1996) considers the issue
of information disclosure to market participants and shows that entrusting the choice of (unveriﬁable) public
information quality to traders who beneﬁt from such information leads to ineﬃciencies, while delegating
the choice of information quality to an independent agent who cannot share trade proﬁts results in eﬃcient
implementation.5
Each of these contribution sheds some light on the role of informational structures in adverse selec-
tion problems, but none of them considers the case of dynamic adverse selection. As shown by Hörner
and Vieille (2009) a dynamic environment can rise new and speciﬁc informational issues. More precisely,
Hörner and Vieille (2009) compare the eﬀects of public versus private price oﬀers in a dynamic adverse
selection model with information and payoﬀ structures as in Akerlof (1970). Diﬀerently from our model,
they consider a situation where there is a unique seller who bargains sequentially with potential buyers until
agreement is reached, if ever. As in our (general) model, Hörner and Vieille (2009) allow for strategic price
5Along this line of research there are also contributions which consider screening strategies. For instance, Lewis and Sappington
(1994) show that, if the seller can make discriminating oﬀers to the buyer, then the eﬀects of a more informed buyer are ambiguous
on the seller’s welfare (see also Ottaviani and Prat, 2001).
5setting (as well as discounting of future payoﬀs) and assume that buyers make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
the seller. Interestingly, Hörner and Vieille (2009) ﬁnd that trade always eventually occurs when oﬀers are
private – i.e., buyers cannot observe past oﬀers made by other buyers – while bargaining often ends at an
impasse when oﬀers are public. This happens because, with public oﬀers, buyers can compete intertempo-
rally deterring each other from making oﬀers that lead to trade. This is a speciﬁc feature of dynamic settings
with strategic price setting. Indeed, also in our model intertemporal competition among buyers can sustain
weak perfect Beyesian equilibria where not all goods are sold in ﬁnite time. In addition, since in our model
buyers stay on the market until they buy a good, there is also the possibility of intertemporal competition
between a buyer now and herself in the future. We discuss in detail this issue in section 7 where we argue
that equilibria sustained by intertemporal competition among buyers are intuitively not robust.
Further evidence of the importance of the observability of price oﬀers is indirectly provided by Moreno
and Wooders (2010) who show that in a dynamic model of decentralized trade all goods entering the market
are sold at some stage, notwithstanding asymmetric information on goods quality. Decentralization of
exchanges is modeled with a random matching mechanism where uninformed buyers make a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer to the informed seller they are matched with. If the seller accepts, then exchange takes place
and both agents exit the market. If the seller rejects the oﬀer, then both agents remain in the market and are
randomly matched again. Note that such a matching mechanism entails private price oﬀers, with the result
that the problem of intertemporal competition mentioned above does not arise. Moreover, since agents
are matched with diﬀerent partners in each round they remain on the market, intertemporal competition
of a single buyer with herself in the past does not arise (see on this our discussion in section 7). As in
the competitive equilibria of Janssen and Roy (2002), full trade emerges thanks to the cost associated with
the delay of exchanges that works as a screening device.6 A relevant diﬀerence between our model and
the one studied by Moreno and Wooders (2010) is that in the latter new cohorts of buyers and sellers can
enter the market in each trading stage. This is similarly to what done in Janssen and Karamychev (2002)
and Janssen and Roy (2004), although diﬀerently from them Moreno and Wooders only consider stationary
competitive equilibria. Thus, since stationarity in our framework is meaningless, the comparison between
our full trade equilibria and those of Moreno and Wooders is not of great interest.7 Still, from a broader
perspective, our model has something to say: thanks to the public knowledge of the informed side of the
market, decentralization of trade – and in particular the privateness of price oﬀers – is not required to
approximate eﬃciency, not even under strategic price setting.
Decentralized trade in the form of random matching is also considered by Kultti et al. (2007) who
study a dynamic adverse selection model where matching between sellers and buyers randomly generates
a competitive situation that varies across diﬀerent matchings. Interestingly, Kultti et al. (2007) ﬁnd that a
stationary equilibrium with equally frequent sales of all qualities is feasible for a narrower range of quality
distributions than in Akerlof (1970). This happens when trading frictions – in the sense of Moreno and
Wooders (2010) – are large enough because frictions increase buyers’ ability to extract positive surplus
from low quality goods when they are matched in a favorable competitive situation. In our model this
eﬀect is absent since trade is not decentralized and buyers have no chance to ﬁnd themselves in a favorable
competitive situation.
6Moreno and Wooders (2010) refer to “frictions” as both the discounting of future gains and the possible delay in matching
with a trading partner. In line with Janssen and Roy (2002), in Moreno and Wooders (2010) as frictions go to zero payoﬀs tend
to the ones obtained in the single-period competitive equilibrium because, although traders become more patient, delay increases
even more.
7We will come back to the issue of new buyers and sellers entering the market at later stages in section 7, where we discuss
possible extensions of our model.
6Another paper that deals with the role of public information in markets plagued by dynamic adverse
selection is Daley and Green (2009). More precisely, Daley and Green (2009) investigate the market for
ﬁnancial assets under asymmetric information with the public disclosure, at each trading stage, of an infor-
mation that aﬀects the future value of the traded asset – as it typically happens in ﬁnancial markets. Daley
and Green (2009) show that, depending on beliefs, in equilibrium there can be immediate trade, no trade at
all, or partial trade. There are various important diﬀerences between our model and this one – e.g., arrival
of new buyers each at each stage, private price oﬀers – but the most important one regards the nature of the
information that is publicly disclosed at each trading stage. In Daley and Green (2009) what is disclosed
is a piece of information that has actually to do with the value of the asset in the future – e.g., the current
cash ﬂow of a ﬁrm that has to be sold – and that is typically thought as a private information of the seller. In
our model, instead, the piece of information that is disclosed to market participants has nothing to do with
the actual value of the goods traded and is not a private information of the sellers but a characteristic of the
market itself. In particular, the size of the informed side of the market is just one piece information even
when sellers bring to the market a large numbers of qualities.
Finally, our paper is also partly related to the literature on sequential bargaining with one-sided incom-
plete information (see, among others, Fudenberg et al., 1985; Evans, 1989; Vincent, 1989; Deneckere and
Liang, 2006). This literature studies a buyer and a seller who bargain over a unit of an indivisible good,
with agents’ valuations being a private information. The basic ﬁndings of this stream of literature are that
the existence of a dynamic dimension together with some form of discounting of future payoﬀs can lead
to intertemporal price discrimination and to the use of waiting times as screening devices (Gul and Son-
nenschein, 1988). Thus, eﬃciency is in general not attained in these models. In particular, as discussed for
Janssen and Roy (2002) and others, the welfare loss due to the discounting of future payoﬀs can persist even
if the frequency of bargaining stages is increased since more stages are then needed to eﬀectively screen
qualities. In our model too there is price discrimination in full trade equilibria with prices (and qualities
sold) increasing over time – a result often referred to as the skimming property. However, since delays
are not used as screening devices, by making bargaining stages more frequent the eﬃcient outcome can be
reached in the limit.
3. A model of dynamic adverse selection with public information about the number of unsold goods
We model a situation of dynamic adverse selection where, in each trading stage, the size of the informed
side of the market is observed by both buyers and sellers. We consider a market with n sellers and m buyers.
We refer to the generic seller as seller i, with i ∈{ 1,...,n}, and to the generic buyer as buyer j, with
j ∈{ 1,...,m}. We assume m > n so that there is enough demand for all goods (for which m ≥ n is
suﬃcient) and there is competition among buyers at every possible stage (which requires m > n). We
will discuss this assumption in section 7. Each seller comes to the market with one good, and goods can
diﬀer by quality across sellers. The quality of a good is a private information of its seller, while the overall
distribution of qualities is a public information. The market stays open from the ﬁrst stage onwards, i.e., for
periods 0,1,2,..., and buyers and sellers stay on the market until they complete a transaction.
In each time period the following things happen in order. Information about the current size of the
informed side of the market – i.e., the number of goods still on the market – is disclosed to all market
participants. Buyers simultaneously make price oﬀers that are valid for the current period only and at which
they are willing to buy one good. Price oﬀers are public, i.e., observable by both buyers and sellers. After
observing price oﬀers, all sellers simultaneously decide whether to sell or not their goods (at the highest
price oﬀer). The allocation of goods is resolved as follows. The sellers who have accepted to sell are
randomly paired with the buyers who have made the highest price oﬀer: a transaction occurs for each
7random pair of one seller and one buyer. Clearly, some sellers (buyers) will not be able to sell (buy) if the
number of sellers wishing to sell is larger (smaller) than the number of buyers making the highest oﬀer.
When a transaction occurs between a seller and a buyer, both the buyer and the seller exit the market and
the good that has been exchanged is no longer traded. We will discuss this important assumption in section
7. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the game.
t t + 1
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Figure 1: Timing of the stage game.
Payoﬀs are assigned as follows. Let 0 <δ≤ 1 be a discount factor common to all players, which can
be interpreted as a measure of either progressive good deterioration or agents’ impatience or a combination
of both.8 All buyers are identical so they have the same payoﬀ structure. We denote with bi the reservation
price of good i for buyers and with si the reservation price of good i for seller i. A possible interpretation
of bi and si is that they are the present values of the stream of services granted to the owner of good i.9
Alternatively, one can think that agents have appropriate options. We note that the payoﬀ of buyers if they
buy nothing is 0. To simplify notation, we also normalize at 0 the payoﬀ of sellers in the case they do not
sell the good – i.e., we systematically subtract si from the payoﬀ of seller i. Therefore, considering present
values at time t￿, a buyer who obtains good i for price p at time t > t￿ evaluates the transaction δt−t￿
(bi − p),
while seller i evaluates the same transaction δt−t￿
(p − si). Without loss of generality, we assume that i￿ > i
implies si￿ ≥ si, meaning that goods are ordered by increasing quality. Moreover, we impose that all goods
brought to the market can potentially generate a surplus for both trading parties, i.e., bi > si for all i.
We introduce some further notation to simplify the exposition. We denote with G the set of all goods,
with G(t) ⊆ G the set of goods still unsold at time t, with gt = ||G(t)|| its cardinality, and with S(t) ⊆ G the
set of goods sold at time t. We refer to gt equivalently as the size of the informed side of the market and
as the number of goods still on the market at time t (we simply use g when we do not refer to a speciﬁc
time period). A generic price oﬀer observed in the market is denoted with p ∈ R+, a generic vector of price
oﬀers at time t (one for each buyer on the market) is denoted with p ∈ R
m−n+g(t)
+ , and the maximum price
oﬀer in pis indicated with pmax(p).
The informational structure is as follows. At each stage buyers and sellers are informed about the
number of goods still on the market. Moreover, they remember all previous oﬀers. In addition, sellers
also observe current oﬀers before taking a decision about selling. Therefore, at each stage a buyer j knows
(gt,Pt−1): the sequence gt = (g0,g1,...,gt) of observed numbers of unsold goods from time 0 to time t, and
8Allowing heterogeneity of discount factors across agents is not conceptually demanding, but it makes the notation heavier.
Since we do not ﬁnd it particularly interesting to consider this heterogeneity, we stick to the case of a common discount factor and
refer to section 7 for a brief discussion on the issue.
9We note that this interpretation does not work for δ = 1 if goods provide an inﬁnite stream of services.
8the sequence Pt−1 = (p0,p1,...,pt−1) of buyers’ price oﬀers from time 0 to time t−1. At each stage a seller
i knows (gt,Pt): the sequence gt = (g0,g1,...,gt) of observed numbers of unsold goods from time 0 to time
t, and the sequence Pt = (p0,p1,...,pt) of all price oﬀers including the list of oﬀers at time t.
A strategy for buyer j is a function πj that assigns a price oﬀer p ∈ R+ to each of her information sets.
A strategy for seller i is a function ρi that assigns a response of either 1 or 0 to each of her information
sets, where 1 means willingness to sell and 0 means refusal to sell. A strategy proﬁle is (π,ρ), where π is
the m-dimensional vector of buyers’ oﬀer functions and ρ is the n-dimensional vector of sellers’s response
functions. We say that a strategy proﬁle (π,ρ) leads to full trade when sooner or later every good is sold,
that is, when there exists some ˆ t such that
￿
t≤ˆ t S(t) = G.
Finally, throughout the paper we focus on the weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (wPBE hereafter) as
a solution concept. In brief, a strategy proﬁle is wPBE if for every player, for every information she may
obtain in the game, there exists a belief on the previous play of the game such that, in the presumption
that subsequent play by other players unfolds as prescribed by the strategy proﬁle, there does not exist a
strictly convenient deviation from the behavior prescribed for the remaining part of the game. Beliefs are
unrestricted everywhere but along the equilibrium path, where instead they are derived by means of Bayes
rule (see e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
4. Existence of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium that leads to full trade for n = 2 and δ = 1
In this section we illustrate how the information about the size of the informed side of the market can be
exploited to obtain an equilibrium strategy proﬁle that leads to full trade. The basic idea is that price oﬀers
are conditioned to the current number of unsold goods in such a way that, ﬁrst, buyers can buy goods of the
lowest possible quality without incurring in expected losses, second, only goods of lowest quality can be
sold without incurring in losses, and, third, sellers of lowest quality cannot do better by refusing to sell. As a
consequence of these price oﬀers, sellers of lowest quality ﬁnds it optimal to sell so that the goods of lowest
quality exit the market and the size of the informed side of the market shrinks accordingly. Iterating such
price oﬀers in the following stages we obtain that the quality of traded goods increases over time as well
as the price at which transactions occur. We emphasize that, in the current setup with δ = 1, observing the
current number of unsold goods at the beginning of each trading stage is crucial for the obtainment of full
trade.10 The reason is that conditional price oﬀers can dissuade sellers from refusing to sell in the hope of
higher future oﬀers since such higher oﬀers will never arrive: if current oﬀers are rejected then the number
of goods still on the market stays put which implies that price oﬀers will be the same in the next period.
The proof that this idea can actually work requires to tackle an issue raised by the presence of a time
discount. As mentioned above, superior qualities are exchanged at higher prices in later periods. However,
with the discounting of future payoﬀs, a price oﬀer in the future – which is in any case bounded by buyers’
valuations – may well not be enough to compensate the cost of waiting. This can result, depending on
parameter values, in the impossibility to have an equilibrium where diﬀerent qualities are sold at diﬀerent
times. In Section 5 we will cope with this problem by means of an algorithm dividing sellers in subsets, such
that each subset comprises sellers that ﬁnd it convenient to sell at the same time. In this section, however,
we prefer to set the issue aside by assuming δ = 1, so that there is no cost of waiting. This allows us to
present the gist of our ﬁndings in a simpler and more intelligible way.
Furthermore, given the illustrative aim of the current section, we make an additional simplifying as-
sumption: we consider only two sellers, i.e., n = 2, so that we may simply speak of a low quality good L
10As already discussed, when δ<1 the waiting time can be used as a screening device to obtain full trade (see Janssen and Roy,
2002).
9and a high quality good H (we also use L and H as identifying subscripts), with sL < sH. We will refer to
the model with δ = 1 and n = 2 as simpliﬁed model.
We are now ready to state our result for the simpliﬁed model.
Proposition 1
When n = 2 and δ = 1, if the size of the informed side of the market is a public information then there exists
a strategy proﬁle that is wPBE and leads to full trade in 2 periods.
Proof. We now show that the following proﬁle of strategies is a wPBE of the above game:
buyers: at every time period t,o ﬀer bL if g = 2, and bH if g = 1;
seller L: at every time period t, accept any oﬀer larger or equal than bL if g = 2, and accept any oﬀer
larger or equal than bH if g = 1;
seller H: accept any oﬀer larger or equal than bH.
We consider decisions at a generic period and we call pmax the maximum price oﬀer in that period. We
begin the check from seller L. Consider ﬁrst the case g = 2. If pmax < bL, then seller L ﬁnds it strictly
convenient to wait the next period, when she will receive an oﬀer equal to bL. If bL ≤ pmax < bH, then seller
L ﬁnds it convenient to accept (strictly convenient if pmax > bL), since in case of refusal she will receive a
price oﬀer equal to bL in the next period and at every future period if she goes on rejecting oﬀers (because
seller H always rejects oﬀers strictly lower than bH). If pmax ≥ bH, then seller L ﬁnds it convenient to
accept (strictly convenient if pmax > bH), since in case of refusal she will receive a price oﬀer equal to bH
in the next period (because seller H accepts the current maximum price oﬀer) and in every future period if
she goes on rejecting oﬀers. Now consider the case g = 1. The price oﬀers in the next period – and in every
future period if seller L goes on rejecting oﬀers – will be equal to bH. Therefore, if pmax < bH then seller L
ﬁnds it strictly convenient to wait, while if pmax > bH then seller L ﬁnds it strictly convenient to accept, and
she is indiﬀerent between accepting and waiting in case pmax = bH.
We now consider seller H. If pmax < bL, then seller L ﬁnds it strictly convenient to wait for one period
(if g = 1) or two periods (if g = 2): if good L is still on the market then this time no sale takes place, the
next period good L will be sold at price bL, and in the following period seller H will receive an oﬀer equal
to bH; if instead good L has already been sold then this time no sale takes place, and the next period seller
H will receive an oﬀer equal to bH. If bL ≤ pmax < bH, then seller H ﬁnds it strictly convenient to delay
selling at least until the next period: if good L is still on the market then it is sold at this time, otherwise no
sale takes place; in any case, the next period seller H will receive an oﬀer equal to bH. If pmax ≥ bH, then
seller H ﬁnds it convenient to accept (strictly convenient if pmax > bH), since in case of refusal she will
receive a price oﬀer equal to bH in the next period (because the number of goods still on the market will be
1 since seller L, if still on the market, accepts the current maximum price oﬀer) and in every future period
if she goes on rejecting oﬀers.
Finally we consider a generic buyer at a generic information set in period t. If g = 2, then following
the equilibrium strategy proﬁle grants a payoﬀ equal to 0, and no positive payoﬀ can ever be obtained
since seller L and seller H do not accept oﬀers lower than bL and bH, respectively. If g = 1, then, if the
information set is on the equilibrium path, then the only admissible belief requires that the good still on
the market is H while, if the information set is not on the equilibrium path, then we choose the belief that
the good still on the market is H. In any case, there is no strictly convenient deviation, since following the
equilibrium strategy proﬁle yields a null payoﬀ, and no positive payoﬀ can ever be obtained since seller H
does not accept oﬀers lower than bH.
10We end this section with two remarks. The ﬁrst remark is on eﬃciency. In the simpliﬁed model every
wPBE that leads to full trade is, obviously, eﬃcient. However, this result crucially hinges on δ = 1, i.e.,
on the absence of discounting of future payoﬀs. Indeed, when exchanges at later stages are worth less
than exchanges in the current stage, equilibria where transactions occur sequentially do not allow to extract
the whole surplus. In Section 6 we will focus on this issue showing that, if the time between any two
subsequent rounds of market exchanges can be made arbitrarily small, then eﬃciency is recovered in the
limit (Proposition 3).
The second remark is on the impossibility to obtain full trade when δ = 1 and the size of the informed
side of the market is not a public information. Consider the above setup with the only diﬀerence that the
number of goods still on the market is not publicly observable. Intuitively, the exchange of the good of
quality H encounters an unsurmountable obstacle which is represented by the impossibility for buyers to
make oﬀers that are conditional on the number of goods still on the market. In fact, a low current price oﬀer
combined with a high unconditional price oﬀer in a later period – which is necessary to convince seller H
to sell – will convince seller L to reject the current low price oﬀer, since she knows that her current rejection
will not prevent buyers from making the high oﬀer in the future. This conﬁrms that, when δ = 1, in order
to obtain full trade additional public information are required, such as the size of the informed side of the
market or goods’ vintage (Hendel et al., 2005) – in contrast, when δ<1 full trade can be obtained by using
delays as screening (Janssen and Roy, 2002).
5. Existence of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium that leads to full trade for n ≥ 2 and δ ≤ 1
In this section we remove the simplifying assumptions applied in section 4 and prove the same existence
result for a more general model. Our objective is to assign the selling of each good inG to some time period
– possibly having more goods sold at the same time – in such a way that the speciﬁed order is sustainable as
wPBE, for a given value of the discount factor. As already anticipated in the previous section, in order to do
this we rely on an algorithm which can be applied to any G￿ ⊆ G yielding a partition of G￿ and a function
H(k,G￿) that assigns each element of the partition of G￿ to a distinct time period k, so that H(0,G￿) is the
subset of goods assigned to period 0 (current period), H(1,G￿) is the subset of goods assigned to period
1 (next period), and so on and so forth. Intuitively, k indicates how many periods in the future goods in
H(k,G￿) will be sold. In this reagard it is also useful to deﬁne the function τ(i,G￿) indicating how many
periods in the future good i will be sold, i.e. τ(i,G￿) = k such that i ∈ H(k,G￿). The algorithm used for the
construction of the partition of G￿ and function H(k,G￿) is relegated to the Appendix. What matters here is
that the algorithm allows us to establish some properties of function H(k,G￿) (which are stated in Lemma
1 below) that turn out to be crucial for proving the existence of a wPBE that leads to full trade in this more
general setup (see Proposition 2 below).
We also introduce some new notation. For any G￿ ⊆ G subset of goods, we denote with β(G￿) the
average value for buyers of goods in G￿, i.e. β(G￿) =
￿
good i∈G￿ bi
||G￿|| . Furthermore, we call G+(g) the set of g
goods with highest index in G.
Lemma 1. There exists a function H(k,G￿) satisfying the following properties:
Property 1. If good i belongs to H(0,G￿), then β(H(0,G)) − si ≥ δk(β(H(0,G￿￿(k))) − si), with
G￿￿(1) = (G￿ \ H(0,G￿)) ∪{ good i} and G￿￿(k) = (G￿￿(k − 1) \ H(0,G￿￿(k − 1))) ∪{ good i}, for all k;




Proof. See the Appendix.
11Property 1 concerns the non-optimality of deferring the time of selling, while Property 2 concerns the
non-optimality of anticipating the time of selling. However, the meaning of these properties is better seen
by considering the case where buyers, in a given time period, oﬀer a price equal to the discounted average
valuation of the goods associated with that time period, i.e., buyers oﬀer δkβ(H(k,G￿)) in k periods from
now. In such a situation, Property 1 says that if seller i is among those who are selected to sell in the current
time period, then she does not ﬁnd convenient to reject current oﬀers and sell in any future period. Property
2, instead, says that if seller i is selected to sell in k periods from now, then she does not ﬁnd convenient to
accept an oﬀer made in previous time periods.
The following proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 1 but obtained in a more general setup with
many sellers and discounting of future payoﬀs. In the proof we propose a strategy proﬁle which leads to
full trade and check that it is indeed a wPBE. Figure 2 illustrates what happens over time when buyers and
sellers follow such equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
Proposition 2
When n ≥ 2 and 0 <δ≤ 1, if the size of the informed side of the market is a public information then there
exists a strategy proﬁle that is wPBE and leads to full trade in at most n periods.
Proof. Preliminarily, we let i∗ be equal to i if i ∈ G+(g) and i∗ be equal to the minimum index in G+(g) if
i ￿ G+(g) We consider (π,ρ) as the strategy proﬁle proposed for equilibrium, where:
buyers: for every buyer j, for every information (gt,Pt−1), buyer j makes the price oﬀer πj(gt,Pt−1) =
β(H(0,G+(gt)));
sellers: for every seller i, for every information (gt,Pt), seller i accepts to sell, i.e., ρi(gt,Pt) = 1, if
and only if pmax(pt) ≥ δ[β(H(τ(i∗,G+(gt)),G+(gt)))].
The strategy proﬁle (π,ρ) leads to sell some goods at every period until all goods are sold, which
happens in at most n periods.
Check for buyers. Consider a generic buyer j and a generic information (gt,Pt−1). If such information
is along the equilibrium path, then Bayes rule forces buyer j to believe that the goods still on the market
are G+(g). If instead the information is oﬀ-equilibrium, then we choose a belief for buyer j such that she
thinks that the goods still on the market are G+(g). By the deﬁnition of the proposed strategy proﬁle and by
construction of function β, if buyer j follows the equilibrium strategy from now on, then she gains a null
expected payoﬀ. We have now to check that no deviation consisting in choosing a diﬀerent action at this
information set and/or at following information sets allows buyer j to gain a positive expected payoﬀ.
We ﬁrst consider deviations at (gt,Pt−1). The strategy proﬁle (π,ρ) requires other buyers (that exist
since m − n + gt ≥ 2 for every t due to m > n) to oﬀer β(H(0,G+(g))). Buyer j will buy nothing if she
oﬀers less, and she will realize a negative expected payoﬀ if she oﬀers more, because of sellers’ proposed
strategies and the construction of functions β and H.
We now turn our attention to future deviations. Consider a future information set (gt￿
,Pt￿−1) that can
be reached from buyer j’s belief at (gt,Pt−1) through some sequence of actions by buyer j when other
players follow their proposed strategies. Bayes rule implies – because a seller of lower quality following
the proposed strategies surely accepts when a seller of higher quality accepts – that buyer j believes that the
goods still on the market at (gt￿
,Pt￿−1) areG+(gt￿
). This allows us to conclude – similarly to what done when
considering deviations at (gt,Pt−1) – that deviations lead either to null or to negative expected payoﬀs.
Check for sellers. Consider a generic seller i and a generic information (gt,Pt). We treat beliefs similarly
to what done for buyers. If information (gt,Pt) is along the equilibrium path, then Bayes rule forces seller
i to believe that the goods still on the market are G+(gt). If instead the information is oﬀ-equilibrium, then
12we choose a belief for seller i such that she thinks that the goods still on the market are G+(gt−1)∪{good i}
(the diﬀerence with respect to the beliefs of buyers is due to the fact that seller i knows that her own good is
still on the market).
Weﬁrstconsiderdeviationsthatanticipatethetimeofsellingwithrespecttothatintheproposedstrategy
proﬁle. Suppose that δβ(H(h − 1,G+(gt))) ≤ pmax(pt) < δβ(H(h,G+(gt))), with h ≤ τ(i,G+(gt)) and where
we set β(H(−1,G)) = 0 for notational consistency. If other sellers follow the proposed strategies, then
sellers of goods in H(0,G+(gt)) ∪ ...∪ H(h − 1,G+(gt)) accept the current oﬀer. If seller i rejects, then
at next time buyers will oﬀer β(H(0,G+(gt) \
￿h
r=0 H(r,G+(gt)), that is equal to β(H(h,G+(gt))). Applying
an analogous reasoning, we may extend this result to future time periods, obtaining that if seller i rejects
for τ(i,G+(gt)) − h + 1 time periods, then she will receive the following list of price oﬀers in present
value: pmax(pt), δβ(H(h,G+(gt))),δ 2β(H(h+1,G+(gt))),...,δ τ(i,G+(gt))−h+1β(H(k,G+(gt))). From pmax(pt) <
δβ(H(h,G+(gt))) and property 2 we get that any decision to accept when the proposed strategy prescribes to
reject is not strictly convenient.
We now consider deviations that posticipate the acceptance time with respect to that in the proposed
strategy proﬁle. We ﬁrst assume i∗ = i. We consider any future (gt￿
,Pt￿
) that can be reached from seller
i’s belief at (gt,Pt) through some sequence of actions by seller i (more precisely, rejections) when other




−1)∪{good i} = G+(gt￿
) (the last inequality because i∗ = i). Property 1 allows
us to establish that rejecting a maximal price oﬀer at the current or at any future information set when the
proposed proﬁle prescribes to accept cannot be strictly convenient for seller i. Finally, we note that when
seller i is diﬀerent from seller i∗, and in particular when i < i∗, to postpone selling is more costly so that the
same conclusion holds a fortiori.
time period 01 . . . k . . . τ(n,G)
sold goods H(0,G) H(1,G). . .H(k,G). . . H(τ(n,G),G)
price β(H(0,G)) β(H(1,G). . .β(H(k,G)) ... H(β(τ(n,G),G))
buyers’ payoﬀ 00 . . . 0 . . . 0
sellers’ payoﬀ
β(H(0,G)) − si,
for good i ∈ H(0,G)
δ(β(H(1,G)) − si),
for good i ∈ H(1,G) ... δk(β(H(k,G)) − si),
for good i ∈ H(k,G)
... δτ(n,G)(β(H(τ(n,G),G))− si),
for good i ∈ H(τ(n,G),G)
Figure 2: Timing of the wPBE in Proposition 2.
6. Welfare analysis and the frequency of trading stages
In the previous two sections we have proven that, thanks to the public knowledge of the size of the
informed side of the market, all goods brought to the market can be traded in ﬁnite time even in the presence
of asymmetric information. Therefore, it seems natural to conclude that, at least in markets where such
information is not naturally available, a benevolent public authority could contrast ineﬃciencies due to
adverse selection by disclosing information about the size of the informed side of the market.
However, as we have already remarked in Sections 1 and 2, when δ<1 full trade can be obtained even if
agents ignore the size of the informed side of the market and do not have any additional public information
(such as goods’ vintages, as in Hendel et al., 2005). Indeed, when agents discount future payoﬀs the waiting
13time before exchanges take place can be used as a screening device, inducing sellers with lower qualities to
sell ﬁrst. In the light of this one might say that there is no need to disclose information about the size of the
informed side of the market. Instead, the public knowledge of the informed size of the market is important
because it often allows a superior outcome, because the use of the discounting of future payoﬀs to screen
qualities imposes an intrinsically non-negligible and non-reducible cost.
The comparison between our result and what obtained in Janssen and Roy (2002) allows to appreciate
the nature of the issue. In our model the discount factor is only an element of realism and does not play any
essential role in allowing a full trade outcome. Proposition 2, where δ = 1, substantiates this claim. Instead,
in Janssen and Roy (2002) the discount factor plays a crucial role: lower quality sellers face a larger cost of
waiting than high quality sellers, so that there always exists a delay of exchanges long enough to convince
lowquality sellersnot towait. This, however, imposes anon-negligible costsince partofthe surplusmust be
burned to sort qualities over time. This cost is also non-reducible in a sensible way: reducing impatience or
increasing the frequency of exchange opportunities – i.e., increasing the discount factor – implies that high
quality sellers have to sell in more distant periods in order to convince low quality sellers not to wait. This
is conﬁrmed by Janssen and Roy (2002) who ﬁnds that, when the discount factor tends to 1, the length of
time required for all exchanges to occur tends to inﬁnity. This fact implies that, despite full trade, eﬃciency
is lost and cannot be recovered even in the limiting case.
On the contrary, when the size of the informed side of the market is observable, full trade can lead to
eﬃciency. This is evident for the case where δ = 1, as summarized by the following straightforward result,
that we give without proof.
Remark 1. When δ = 1, any full trade outcome is eﬃcient.
What is most important, however, is that we are able to get arbitrarily close to eﬃciency also for the
case in which agents eﬀectively discount future payoﬀs. In particular, in the following we argue that if the
spell between any two subsequent stages of trading is made smaller and smaller, then eﬃciency is recovered
in the limit.
If δ is the discount factor for one period of time and trading stages are ∆t time distant from each other,
then the discount factor between the current stage and the next stage is δ∆t. We deﬁne the frequency of
trading stages as 1/∆t. We measure the welfare of an outcome with the sum, over all agents (buyers
and sellers), of individual payoﬀs. We refer to the maximum welfare that is attainable with an outcome





As the frequency of trading stages increases, the maximum attainable welfare tends to the entire potential
surplus from exchanges.
Proof. We note that in the wPBE that we have used in the proof of Proposition 2 all transactions occur
within n periods. Since the surplus extracted from the exchange of good i is at least δn(bi − si), it clearly
converges to bi − si as the frequency of trading stages increases.
Proposition 3 suggests an important line of intervention by a public authority. The disclosure of in-
formation about the size of the informed side of the market may be usefully combined with an increase in
11Such maximum attainable welfare is well deﬁned, since there is a ﬁnite number of outcomes with a welfare larger or equal
than the welfare attained by the wPBE shown to exist in Proposition 2.
14the frequency of trading stages. The former kind of intervention allows full trade to be sustained as wPBE
without the use of the cost of waiting as in trade as screening device, while the latter kind of intervention
allows total surplus to approach the eﬃcient level, even when agents discount future payoﬀs.
7. Discussion
In this section we discuss several aspects and implications of our model. Since the arguments are both
long and articulated, we ﬁnd it convenient to organize the discussion in topic-speciﬁc paragraphs.
Features of full trade equilibria. In the following we comment on a couple of features that are evidently
possessed by the wPBE in Proposition2 as well as by any other wPBE leading to full trade, as it is intuitively
understood.
A ﬁrst important feature that characterizes wPBE proﬁles that lead to full trade is the so-called skimming
property: lower quality goods are sold earlier and at a lower price than higher quality goods. Putting it
diﬀerently, in each time period the lowest quality goods are sold and, as a consequence, the minimum
quality of goods still on the market increases over time. This also implies that the actual selling price
increases over time. The skimming property is a quite common feature in dynamic models of trade under
asymmetric information.12 The skimming property is inherently related to the type of strategic situation
that we are modeling here, and is robust with respect to the details of modelization. Indeed, for buyers not
to incur in losses it must be that lower qualities are sold separately from higher qualities and the only way to
achieve this is to sell lower qualities ﬁrst. In fact, if higher qualities were to be sold ﬁrst then buyers would
have to make high price oﬀers when low quality goods are still on the market, and such high oﬀers would
induce the low quality sellers to accept, implying a negative expected payoﬀ for buyers.
A second feature which characterizes full trade equilibria is that all surplus goes to sellers. This feature
depends crucially on the fact that buyers always outnumber sellers so that there is competition among
buyers whatever the number of goods still on market. We stress that diﬀerent assumptions about the relative
numerosity of buyers and sellers can lead to equilibria where buyers obtain part of the surplus. In the
followingparagraphaboutextensions, webrieﬂysketchthecaseofamonopsonisticbuyerwherehersurplus
is not zero.
Assumptions and extensions. A crucial assumption for the working of our model is that when a good is sold
to a buyer, such good is no longer traded in that market. The reason why this assumption is crucial lies in
the fact that the size of the informed side of the market only allows to separate lowest qualities from the rest
of the goods, implying that if the lowest quality goods do not leave the market once sold then higher quality
goods will never be sold. Of course, this does not mean that re-sales cannot take place but requires, as for
instance in Hendel et al. (2005), that buyers can at least distinguish goods already sold once from goods
never sold before in that market.
Another important assumption concerns the stationarity of the set of buyers and sellers. In our model
sellers and buyers exit the market after completing a transaction, but no new seller or buyer enters the
market. In particular, the arrival of new goods might represent a threat to full trade since, intuitively, it
makes the size of the informed side of the market less informative about existing qualities. Indeed, changes
in the number of goods still on the market would be a joint result of sales and arrival of new sellers – and,
hence, of new goods. The issue here is how to let agents correctly infer the distribution of qualities induced
12The property is usually stated in models of durable goods monopoly, see for instance Fudenberg et al. (1985) and Gul et al.
(1986), but it can also be found in a literature closer to ours, see for instance Janssen and Roy (2002).
15by the arrival of new goods. One possibility is to let agents know from the beginning the number of goods
and the distribution of qualities entering in each period. This can be modeled with a grand set of sellers
and a grand set of buyers with a subset of agents that are present from the initial period while additional
sellers and buyers enter at known times with known distribution of qualities. Alternatively, we could have
diﬀerent markets for goods arrived at diﬀerent dates. This can be easily obtained in the case agents are not
anonymous with respect to the date of arrival.
There are many other details of our model which have a non-negligible role, but they can be consid-
ered as less important for the gist of our results. For instance, a diﬀerent bargaining structure might be
assumed (we might consider sellers making price oﬀers or sellers and buyers alternating in making oﬀers),
price oﬀers might not be a public information (we might use a matching model and only consider bilateral
interactions), the relative numerosity of buyers and sellers might be diﬀerent or buyers might be willing to
buy more than one good (for instance, we might consider a monopsonistic buyer, as discussed below). We
might also opt for a walrasian framework instead of considering strategic price setting. Each of these vari-
ants should be considered with care, and some technical issues certainly arise. However, the mechanism that
exploits information on the size of the informed size of the market to enforce full trade is still applicable to
such variants, although the policy implications might be diﬀerent. For instance, consider the variant where
there is a monopsonistic buyer who never exits the market, that makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to sellers in
every time period, and who is willing to buy whatever number of goods, provided the price is low enough.
In this variant of our model we can ﬁnd a set of strategy proﬁles that are wPBE and lead to full trade, with
the only important diﬀerence with respect to what shown in this paper that the entire surplus would be earnt
by the monopsonistic buyer. The diﬀerent distribution of surplus is not surprising as it clearly depends on
the absence of competition among buyers. The policy implications may however be diﬀerent. Indeed, in
the case of a monopsonistic buyer the usefulness of disclosing information on the number of goods still on
the market is limited since the buyer can easily keep track of them. Our main result is better thought of as a
normative suggestion to the monopsonistic buyer in favor of using a strategy that conditions price oﬀers on
the size of the informed side of the market.
Anotherassumptionthatmightbeeasilydispensedwithisthehomogeneityofbuyers’intheirvaluations
of goods. The fact that diﬀerent buyers have diﬀerent valuations might reduce the competitive pressure,
possibly allowing some buyers to obtain a positive surplus. Similarly, we may also let the discount factor
vary across agents. This would have the intuitive consequence of creating diﬀerences in buyers’ valuation
that evolve over time. We note that the procedure associated with Lemma 1 would work in a similar way
and with similar outcomes for what concerns the grouping of sellers over time.
Finally, we want to stress that the goods brought to the market in our model are best interpreted as
durable goods, at least when δ<1. This implicitly points to a potentially interesting issue: how to extend
our results to a model where agents discount future payoﬀs and goods have the standard features of non-
durable goods – such as exhaustion upon consumption. Indeed, if the goods brought to the market are
non-durable, then some of the arrangements which can reduce the loss due to adverse selection, such as
leasing and secondary markets, become ineﬀective (see Waldman, 2003, for a comprensive discussion the
functioning of real markets for durable goods). Moreover, delays in exchanges are intrinsically useless as
screening devices since the seller’s cost of delaying a sale is the same for high quality and low quality goods,
because goods do not provide a stream of services over time. On the contrary, our mechanism based on the
public knowledge of the size of the informed side of the market does not seem to suﬀer from this problem,
and it may prove to be eﬀective in obtaining both full trade and eﬃciency, provided that trading stages are
made frequent enough. We are aware, however, that some futher reasons for the emergence of non-full
trade equilibria could arise because of the features of non-durable goods, such as the possibility that a seller
16consumes her own good at an initial stage of the game in the belief that no convenient oﬀer will me made
in the future.
Intertemporalcompetitionandexistenceofnon-fulltradeequilibria. InPropositions1and2wehaveshown
that a wPBE exists where every good is traded. However, we have been silent on whether other wPBEs exist
that do not lead to full trade. In the following we argue that such non-full trade equilibria might actually
exist, and that their existence depends on intertemporal competition among buyers. Finally, we suggest that
non-full trade wPBEs are not particularly robust.
There are two types of intertemporal competition that may arise in our framework. The ﬁrst type is
eﬀective in preventing full trade only when the dicount factor is equal to 1. The following sketched example
illustrates. Suppose that there exists a wPBE such that some goods remain unsold. We call i the minimum
quality of unsold goods. Consider a time period where, according to the equilibrium strategies, no good is
sold and will ever be sold. Consider then a buyer who is still on the market in such time period and who
may oﬀer a price p strictly comprised between si and bi, in the hope to induce seller i to sell her good. Note
that seller i would indeed proﬁt from selling. However, such unexpectedly high oﬀer is observable by other
buyers, who may adopt a strategy that reacts to high oﬀers by retaliating in the next period with a price oﬀer
equal to bi. Such a retaliation induces seller i to reject the initial unexpectedly high oﬀer. Note that this
retaliation strategy does not lead to any loss for the buyers adopting it, and eﬀectively makes the deviating
buyer indiﬀerent between deviating and not deviating (since in any case she makes a payoﬀ equal to zero).
This type of intertemporal competition sustains non-full trade wPBEs. However, it can be avoided if the
time discount is strictly lower than 1. In such a case, in fact, a buyer could oﬀer a price p strictly comprised
between bi and δbi, in the attempt to gain from the purchase of unsold goods. This price oﬀer grants to
seller i a positive payoﬀ in case of exchange, and it cannot be outperformed by any future retaliating price
oﬀer by other buyers, unless they oﬀer more than bi which would imply incurring in a loss.
The second type of intertemporal competition is more speciﬁc to our setup since it exploits the infor-
mation about the size of the informed side of the market. As such, it can be considered a byproduct of the
public knowledge of this piece of information and, unfortunately, it is also more robust to diﬀerent degrees
of discounting. The following sketched example illustrates. Suppose that in a wPBE there are two goods
on the market that are never sold, call them L and H. Consider a buyer who deviates from her equilibrium
strategy in the hope to gain some surplus from the purchase of unsold goods, and suppose that she makes
a price oﬀer strictly comprised between bL and δbL. Other buyers may react by oﬀering (bL + bH)/2 in
the next period, which in the case (bL + bH)/2 > sH may convince both seller L and seller H to reject the
current oﬀer and accept theirs. This kind of intertemporal competition could be contrasted by the initial
buyer by considering a diﬀerent behavior: making a price oﬀer strictly comprised between (bL +bH)/2 and
δ(bL + bH)/2, which could result in the purchase of both goods. Indeed, other buyers cannot make more
appealing oﬀers in the next period without incurring in a loss, if they want to buy both goods. However,
they may take advantage of the situation and try to buy only good H, by means of a reaction strategy that
exploits the information about the number of goods still on the market. More precisely, they may oﬀer bH in
the next period conditional on the fact that the number of goods still on the market decreases by one. Given
these strategies, seller L obtains a positive payoﬀ from accepting the initial deviation and cannot hope to
earn more by rejecting it, since in such a case other buyers would not make a higher oﬀer in the following
period; instead, seller H ﬁnds it convenient to wait until such a higher oﬀer, provided that the discount factor
is close enough to 1. Note that the described reaction strategy is not costly for the buyers adopting it. The
only one who loses is the buyer who attempts the initial deviation, that would be proﬁtable (in expectation)
in the case both seller L and seller H accept it, but it is not in the case only seller L accepts to sell. In
conclusion, this type of intertemporal competition turns out to be eﬀective in preventing the emergence of
17full trade even in the presence of a time discount, although not for any value of the discount factor.
Note that when δ<1 the second type of intertemporal competition is the only cause of trade failure.
More precisely, in any wPBE there can be periods of no trade – considering wPBEs that lead to full trade
too – only if the second type of intertemporal competition is at work. When future payoﬀs are discounted,
the minimum quality on the market is known in equilibrium and, hence, it is costly for both trading parties
to renounce trading since there always exist mutually advantageous agreements. In order not to have one of
such mutually advantageous agreements being exploited it must be that the minimum quality seller expects
higher oﬀers in the future. Therefore, with reference to the sellers of minimum quality goods that are not
sold in a given period, buyers’ equilibrium strategies must prescribe to make more appealing price oﬀers
in following periods whenever they observe a buyer deviating from her equilibrium strategy and oﬀering
a mutually advantageous proposal. At the same time, buyers’ equilibrium strategies must prescribe price
oﬀers that are not above sellers’ reservation price along the equilibrium path. In other words, in order to
hinder trading of the lowest quality goods in any given period, buyers’ strategy must prescribe price oﬀers
which are conditional on a buyer’s deviation, that is, intertemporal competition must be at work.
Since intertemporal competition works through reaction strategies conditioned on the observation of
deviations by some buyer, one might think that if price oﬀers were observable only by sellers, and not by
other buyers, then this type of intertemporal competition would be avoided, ensuring that all wPBEs lead to
full trade. Unfortunately, that is not the case because a similar kind of intertemporal competition can exist
between a buyer in the current period and the same buyer in later periods. Under perfect recall, every buyer
remembers at least her own oﬀers at previous times so that she can make oﬀers that are conditional on that
information. Therefore, the kind of reaction outlined above may come from the same buyer making the
initial deviation. Indeed, such a behavior is not costly for her, since sellers will never accept lower oﬀers in
the conviction that future oﬀers by the same buyer will be in accordance with her equilibrium strategy, and
hence more convenient for them. Therefore, even if price oﬀers cannot be observed by other buyers there
might exist wPBEs that do not lead to full trade. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that this possibility
appears as crucially depending on the fact that buyers always earn a null payoﬀ in equilibrium.
We also observe that there are important real situations where the type of intertemporal competition
which can hinder full trade is not likely to emerge. A ﬁrst case is what we may refer to as extreme adverse
selection, i.e., a situation in which goods of diﬀerent qualities cannot be sold in the same period because
buyers’ oﬀers should be so high to convince sellers to accept that they would be unproﬁtable. In the above
sketched example, extreme adverse selection would arise whenever (bL + bH)/2 < sH. Under extreme
adverse selection, only the ﬁrst type of intertemporal competition is at work, so that the presence of a non-
negligible discount factor is enough to ensure that every wPBE leads to full trade. We are aware that many
real situations do not entail extreme adverse selection, but we observe that it is more likely to hold when
market forces push buyers’ valuations to be very close to sellers’ valuations.
A second case is what we may call extreme impatience, i.e., a situation in which the time discount is so
low that rejecting in order to accept higher oﬀers in the next period turns out not to be convenient. More
precisely, and referring to the usual example above, when buyers react to a deviation by means of an oﬀer
conditional on the number of goods still on the market, such a conditional oﬀer is convenient for seller
H only if the discount factor is close enough to 1. Therefore, when agents are suﬃciently impatient – or
equivalently when goods deteriorate quickly enough – seller H always prefers to accept the initial deviation
making intertemporal competition ineﬀective.
Finally, let us stress that, even when they exist, non-full trade wPBEs are not particularly robust. In the
ﬁrst place, each non-full trade wPBE is strictly Pareto dominated by a full trade wPBE. In the light of this,
one might argue that coordination is more likely to arise on the Pareto superior equilibria, thus suggesting
18that the likelihood of non-full trade is low. A second argument, which is probably stronger, concerns the
fact that in any non-full trade wPBE, deviating and making an oﬀer slightly higher than si – where i denotes
the lowest quality among unsold goods – is a weakly dominant choice for the buyers still on the market.
Indeed, if sellers reject her oﬀer she will still get a payoﬀ equal to zero, while in the case sellers accept her
oﬀer (e.g., by mistake) the deviating buyer earns a strictly positive payoﬀ. Note that if sellers actually reject
the deviation, in the next period buyers actively competing across time will make a price oﬀer that seller i
will accept, deviating from the current equilibrium towards full trade. Otherwise, if buyers deviate and keep
on making low oﬀers after seller i has rejected proﬁtable price oﬀers in the ﬁrst place, then sooner or later
seller i’s beliefs about future oﬀers are likely to be revised, letting her accept current oﬀers that are larger
than si but lower than bi, thus making current deviations a more attractive choice. This kind of reasoning
provides a strong argument, we think, which goes against the robustness of non-full trade wPBE.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a dynamic model of trade under adverse selection, which emerges because
the quality of goods is a seller’s private information. We have shown that, if the size of the informed side of
the market (that in our model corresponds to the number of goods still on the market) is public information,
then conditional price oﬀers can sustain a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium where all goods brought to the
market are exchanged in a bounded number of trading stages. Moreover, we have shown that this equilib-
rium tends to eﬃciency when the frequency of trading stages increases, even in the presence of a discount
factor. This conﬁrms the ﬁnding of Hendel et al. (2005) that additional information is needed to properly
solve dynamic adverse selection problems – indeed, solutions obtained by exploiting the discounting of
future payoﬀs as a screening device have been shown to be incapable of restoring eﬃciency (Janssen and
Roy, 2002).
Our ﬁndings suggest a combination of two policy interventions whenever proper solutions to dynamic
adverse selection do not arise endogenously. On the one hand, information about the size of the informed
side of the market should be systematically disclosed to all market participants and, on the other hand,
the frequency of trading stages should be rised as much as possible. By so doing, we expect to get close
enough to eﬃciency, provided that intertemporal competition among buyers does not arise. In this regard,
we have argued that intertemporal competition does not seem to be particularly eﬀective in keeping agents
from exploiting all trading opportunities. In particular, we have stressed that there are no strong reasons
preventing buyers from making mutually advantageous oﬀers to sellers of yet unsold goods. At any rate, a
benevolent public authority could help agents to coordinate on Pareto superior equilibria where all goods
are exchanged.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We use the following algorithm to build up a function H(k,G￿) that satisﬁes the proper-
ties in Lemma 1.
Algorithm. The algorithm applies to any G￿ ⊆ G.
Step 0. Deﬁne a function τ which assigns to every good i in G￿ a natural number – interpreted as time
– as follows: τ(i,G￿) = ||{good ￿ ∈ G￿ : ￿ ≤ i}||. Initially this function simply assigns each good to a
time period according to its index, but then, as the algorithm unfolds, some goods will be moved to earlier
periods and grouped together with other goods. Let H(k,G￿) = {good i ∈ G￿ : τ(i,G￿) = k} be the function
assigning to each time period a set of goods to be sold, as given by function τ (of whom H(k,G￿) might
19thought of as a sort of inverse). Note that function β(H), as deﬁned in Section 5, can be intepreted as the
price oﬀer whose expected value for buyers is zero if all and only the sellers in H accept the oﬀer.
Step 1. Set k equal to the maximum value of function τ over G￿, and indicate with i the good with the
minimum index in H(k,G￿).
Step 2. Consider the following inequality, where i ∈ H(k,G￿):





Seller i is for the moment assigned to period k, i.e., τ(i,G￿) = k. The left-hand side represents the value for
seller i of accepting the price oﬀer made in k −1 periods from now, while the right-hand side represents the
value for seller i of accepting the price oﬀer made in k periods from now.
Update and go back to step 1. If the inequality is satisﬁed, change the image of i according to τ from
k to k − 1, while leaving the image of other elements of G￿ unchanged, and then go back to step 1.
Update and go back to step 2. If the inequality is not satisﬁed and k ≥ 2, then set k equal to k − 1 and,
subsequently, indicate with i the good with the minimum index in H(k,G￿), and then go back to step 2.
Exit algorithm. If the inequality is not satisﬁed and k = 1, then exit the algorithm.
It is easy to check that a function τ is univocally selected when exiting the algorithm. As a consequence,
a function H is selected as well.
We are now ready to check the properties stated in Lemma 1.
Check of property 1. We show that the inequality holds for k = 1, then the result can be extended to
any k by iteration. The check trivially holds with equality if ||H(0,G￿)|| = 1, so we limit our attention to
the case ||H(0,G￿)|| ≥ 2. We ﬁrst consider good i having the maximum index in H(0,G￿), and we apply the
algorithm toG￿￿(1). Clearly, good i belongs to H(0,G￿￿(1)). We consider the following assignment of goods
to time periods: the goods in G￿\G￿￿(1) are associated to the ﬁrst ||G￿\G￿￿(1)|| periods, one per time period,
so that good 1 is associated to time period 0, good 2 is associated to time period 1, ..., good ||G￿ \G￿￿(1)|| is
associated to time period ||G￿ \ G￿￿(1)|| − 1, and then the subsets of goods found by means of the algorithm
applied to G￿ are associated to the following time periods, so that H(0,G￿￿(1)) is associated to time period
||G￿ \ G￿￿(1)||, H(1,G￿￿(1)) is associated to time period ||G￿ \ G￿￿(1)|| + 1, .... We note that this particular
assignment of goods to time periods is an intermediate state in the algorithm applied to G￿ (for this it is
crucial that good i has the maximum index in H(0,G￿)). Therefore, we know that the algorithm moves good
i to a previous time period, and β({good i − 1}−si ∪{ good i}) ≥ δ(β(H(0,G￿￿(1))) − si). The algorithm will
in general entail iterations of steps 1 and 2. Note that at every iteration of step 2, the discounted values of β
computed on the subsets of goods associated with k and k − 1 do not decrease (while the discounted values
of β computed on all other subsets of goods are unaﬀected). So, focussing our attention on good i, we have
a chain of inequalities of the form: H(0,G￿) − si ≥ ...≥ δ(β(H(0,G￿￿(1))) − si). Finally, when good i does
not have minimum index in H(0,G￿), the result holds a fortiori because the reservation value si is lower or
equal (and hence waiting is more costly), and the average value β(H(0,G￿￿(1))) is easily seen to be lower or
equal as well.









. Note that the latter
inequality holds for any seller other than seller i too, and in particular it holds for any seller with an index
lower than i that is associated to earlier time periods. So, if we consider good i￿ belonging to H(τ(i,G￿)−1),
it must be that β(H(τ(i,G￿) − 2)) − si￿ <δ
￿
β(H(τ(i,G￿) − 1)) − si￿
￿
. Note also that this same inequality
holds a fortiori if we replace si with si￿, implying that β(H(τ(i,G￿) − 2)) − si <δ
￿






. Proceeding along this line of argument, the property is established.
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